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HOW TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF EVIL:  
A DEONTOLOGICAL STRATEGY
Justin Mooney
One paradigmatic argument from evil against theism claims that (1) if God ex-
ists, then there is no gratuitous evil. But (2) there is gratuitous evil, so (3) God 
does not exist. I consider three deontological strategies for resisting this ar-
gument. Each strategy restructures existing theodicies which deny (2) so that 
they instead deny (1). The first two strategies are problematic on their own, 
but their primary weaknesses vanish when they are combined to form the 
third strategy, resulting in a promising new approach to the problem of evil.
1. The Argument from Gratuitous Evil
Arguments from evil against theism come in many varieties, but one par-
adigmatic argument from evil goes as follows:
(1) If God exists, then there is no gratuitous evil.
(2) There is gratuitous evil. So,
(3) God does not exist.1
By “God,” I mean a being that is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally 
perfect. By “evil” I mean any non-instrumentally bad states of affairs. As 
for the term “gratuitous,” I want this to capture the two main ways some 
philosophers think that an evil might be impermissible for God. So I will 
stipulate that an evil is gratuitous if and only if it is either (i) not tied to 
a good that outweighs it, or (ii) impermissible regardless of whether it is 
tied to a good that outweighs it.2
When I speak of an evil being tied to a good, what I mean is that the 
good can be brought about only by permitting either that evil, or some 
evil equally bad or worse. Being tied to a good is an agent-relative matter. 
For example, there might be a good G that nomically necessitates an evil 
E. Then, relative to any ordinary human agent, E is tied to G. But since 
1The argument from gratuitous evil is due to Rowe, “The Problem of Evil.” I’ve based this 
formulation on DePoe, “Epistemological Framework.” 
2The first disjunct of this definition is fairly standard, and reflects that of Rowe, “The 
Problem of Evil.” 
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God has power over the laws of nature, God can bring about G without 
permitting E. So although E is tied to G for human agents, it is not tied to 
G for God. But if we imagine instead that G entails E, then E will be tied to 
G even for God.3
When I say that a good outweighs an evil, what I mean is that a state of 
affairs which includes both the good and the evil is better, ceteris paribus, 
than one which lacks both. It doesn’t matter whether the overall value of 
the state of affairs that includes both the good and the evil is a function 
of the respective values of the good and the evil when each is taken on its 
own, or if their combination is instead a Moorean organic unity.4
There are two ways for an evil to be gratuitous by my definition. The 
first is by not being tied to an outweighing good. Call evils which satisfy 
this condition conditionally gratuitous. Since being tied to an outweighing 
good is an agent-relative affair, an evil may be conditionally gratuitous for 
some agents and not others. The second way for an evil to be gratuitous is 
for that evil to be impermissible regardless of whether it is tied to an out-
weighing good. An evil E satisfies this condition iff E is (i) impermissible, 
and (ii) the facts in virtue of which E is impermissible can obtain with or 
without E being tied to any outweighing goods. Call evils that satisfy this 
condition unconditionally gratuitous. Below we will see that unconditional 
gratuitousness can be agent-relative in a certain sense as well. Notice that 
these two types of gratuitousness are not mutually exclusive. An evil 
which is not tied to an outweighing good might also be impermissible 
independently of this fact.5
I think it is safe to say that most opponents of the argument resist 
premise (2). But I will join that minority who resist (1), and the even 
smaller minority who resist (1) on deontological grounds.6 Though con-
troversial, deontology is a well-established family of theories that does at 
least as good a job of capturing some of our important ethical intuitions as 
its major rivals. So, it is an independently motivated foundation on which 
to build a response to the problem of evil. Moreover, we will see that a 
3An evil E will also be tied to G for God if G entails, not E per se, but that God permits E 
(Crummett, “Sufferer-Centered Theodicies”). 
4This is a standard account of what it is for an evil to be outweighed. The notion of an 
organic unity was introduced by Moore, Principia Ethica, and the idea that God “defeats” 
evils by incorporating them into highly valuable organic unities is developed by Chisholm, 
“Good and Evil”; Adams, Horrendous Evils; and McCann, Creation. 
5Reitan, “Consequentialist Morality,” documents that most discussion in the literature 
has focused on what I am calling conditionally gratuitous evil. For discussion of what I am 
calling unconditionally gratuitous evil, see, e.g., McNaughton, “The Problem of Evil” and “Is 
God (Almost) a Consequentialist?”; Mooney, “A Deontological Problem”; Murray, Nature Red 
in Tooth and Claw, ch. 6; cf. Sterba, “Skeptical Theism.” 
6That is, by drawing on notions that are traditionally associated with deontology. I take 
no stand on whether they should further be regarded as exclusively or definitively deon-
tological. Both the general point that one’s ethical theory may impact how one presents or 
responds to the problem of evil, and the more specific point that deontology does so, have 
been made before. Pierce, “Moderate Deontology,” even suggests using a Rossian frame-
work. 
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deontological approach to theodicy does not need to begin from scratch, 
because it allows us to restructure existing theodicies that challenge (2) so 
that they instead target (1).7
In what follows, I consider the prospects of three deontological strate-
gies for rejecting (1). I will argue that the first two are problematic on their 
own, but that their primary weaknesses vanish when the strategies are 
combined to form a third strategy. The result is a promising new approach 
that theists can pursue in their efforts to solve the problem of evil. But to 
be clear, my aim is not to solve the problem of evil in a single paper; it is 
only to outline a plausible strategy for doing so.
2. The Deontological Framework
Before considering the three deontological strategies, let me lay out the 
ethical tools I will be using. Since it will be convenient to use a certain de-
ontological theory, I will presuppose Markosian’s “Rossian Minimalism.”8 
On Rossian Minimalism, an agent’s all-things-considered obligations 
emerge from the interaction of Rossian prima facie duties. The defining 
thesis of this view, as Markosian states it, is: “An act is morally right if and 
only if it minimizes prima facie duty violations by its agent.”9 I want to 
make two small adjustments to this formulation. First, like certain other 
philosophers, I prefer the term “pro tanto” to “prima facie” in this con-
text.10 Second, I take it that Markosian thinks the rightness of an act does 
not merely track facts about pro tanto duties, but also obtains in virtue 
of facts about pro tanto duties. So, I will modify Markosian’s statement 
of the view to read “An act is morally right if and only if and because it 
minimizes pro tanto duty violations by its agent.”11
I will also embrace the traditionally deontological assumption that 
there are sometimes discrepancies between which actions an agent may 
or ought to perform, on the one hand, and which actions would have the 
best consequences, on the other hand. Following Scheffler, we can sort 
these discrepancies into two categories.12
First, there are what Scheffler calls agent-centered restrictions.13 These are 
“restrictions on action which have the effect of denying that there is any 
non-agent-relative principle for ranking overall states of affairs from best 
to worst such that it is always permissible to produce the best available 
7Reitan, “A Deontological Theodicy,” has made this point about what I will call the re-
striction strategy below. 
8Markosian, “Rossian Minimalism.” 
9Markosian, “Rossian Minimalism,” 7.
10Ross, The Right and the Good, himself used the term “prima facie duty,” but expressed 
dissatisfaction with it. 
11I owe the useful locution “if and only if and because” to Joshua Spencer. 
12Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism. 
13I will take no stand in this paper on exactly how Scheffler’s agent-centered restrictions 
and prerogatives relate to similar notions discussed by other authors, e.g., Nagel, The Possi-
bility of Altruism; and Parfit, Reasons and Persons. 
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states of affairs so characterized.”14 For example, suppose you can pre-
vent five other people from breaking promises only by breaking a similar 
promise of your own. Since promise-breaking is bad, the consequences of 
breaking your promise would be five times better than keeping it (ceteris 
paribus). But it’s plausible that you are still not permitted to break your 
promise.15
In the context of Rossian Minimalism, the closest thing to what Schef-
fler calls agent-centered restrictions will be certain all-things-considered 
obligations that arise out of the interaction of an agent’s pro tanto duties in 
a specific situation: namely, any such obligations which require an agent 
to bring about less than the best state of affairs she is able to bring about 
in that situation. So, for the purposes of this paper, I will simply stipulate 
that agent-centered restrictions are these all-things-considered obliga-
tions. Given this stipulation and the assumption that Rossian Minimalism 
is true, an agent is bound by an agent-centered restriction in a situation if 
and only if and because the agent is able to minimize her pro tanto duty 
violations only by bringing about a state of affairs that is less than the best 
state of affairs she is able to bring about in that situation.
Second, there are what Scheffler calls agent-centered prerogatives. An 
agent-centered prerogative is a moral prerogative “which has the effect of 
denying that one is always required to produce the best overall state of af-
fairs.”16 For example, one might think it is permissible to spend a holiday 
bonus on entertainment instead of giving it to a good charity.
In the context of Rossian Minimalism, the closest thing to what Schef-
fler calls agent-centered prerogatives will be certain all-things-considered 
permissions that survive the interaction of an agent’s pro tanto duties in 
a specific situation: namely, any such permissions which allow an agent 
to bring about less than the best state of affairs she is able to bring about 
in that situation. So, I will simply stipulate that agent-centered preroga-
tives are these all-things-considered permissions. Given this stipulation 
and the assumption that Rossian Minimalism is true, an agent enjoys an 
agent-centered prerogative in a situation if and only if and because the 
agent can minimize her pro tanto duty violations by bringing about a state 
of affairs that is not the best state of affairs she is able (and perhaps also 
permitted) to bring about in that situation.17
Different moral agents can have different agent-centered restrictions 
and prerogatives with respect to the same state of affairs. For example, 
suppose I have a large sum of extra money that I could give to a charity, 
14Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, 2–3.
15Thanks to Pete Graham for this example. 
16Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism, 5.
17The editor observes that, by my definitions, having an agent-centered restriction entails 
having an agent-centered prerogative, and this is a nonstandard way of thinking about pre-
rogatives, since we ordinarily think we are free not to exercise them. Readers unhappy with 
my terminology are welcome to substitute “agent-centered permission” (an alternative I owe 
to Ernesto Garcia). 
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and you do not. If I gave the money to a certain charity, a great deal of 
suffering would be prevented. If you took the money from me without my 
permission and gave it to that same charity, the same suffering would be 
prevented, and I would forgive you for taking the money. So more harm 
would be prevented by giving the money to charity, whether you give it 
away or I do. Even so, you are not permitted to give the money away, be-
cause it is not yours to give. I think in this case you have an agent-centered 
restriction against giving the money to charity, while I do not.
In what follows, it will be useful to have a name for certain kinds of 
cases where different agents have different agent-centered restrictions 
and prerogatives with respect to the same state of affairs. When an agent 
has a prerogative to maximize value in ways that other agents are not 
permitted to, let’s say that agent has a maximizing prerogative. And when 
an agent has an obligation to maximize value in ways that other agents are 
not permitted to, let’s say that agent has a maximizing restriction. Now let’s 
put these tools to work.
3. The Restriction Strategy
The first strategy for resisting (1) is what I will call the restriction strategy. 
It employs either agent-centered or maximizing restrictions to argue that 
God is obligated to permit gratuitous evil. Let’s consider conditionally 
gratuitous evil first.
3.1. The Restriction Strategy and Conditionally Gratuitous Evil
Just because an agent can prevent an evil without sacrificing a greater 
good, that doesn’t mean she is permitted to. Arguably, agent-centered 
restrictions sometimes require agents to permit conditionally gratuitous 
evils, such as when one agent is not permitted to interfere with the poor 
and even destructive choices of another agent.18 So, it’s conceivable that 
God might face agent-centered restrictions that require God to permit evil 
that is conditionally gratuitous.
Reitan defends this view.19 Moreover, he shows that one can pursue this 
strategy by modifying existing theodicies that, in their standard form, at-
tack (2). Here is my preferred way of presenting his idea. Most theodicies 
consist of the conjunction of a metaphysical thesis (MT) and an axiological 
thesis (AT). Where “E” names the evils that the theist is attempting to ex-
plain, and “G” names the greater good or goods which are supposed to 
justify God’s permission of E, a typical theodicy claims that:
MT: For God, E is tied to G.
AT: E is outweighed by G.
18Thanks to Brian Guiley, who first helped me to see this point. 
19Reitan, “A Deontological Theodicy.” See also Little, A Creation-Order Theodicy; Haig, “A 
Deontological Solution”; Pierce, “Moderate Deontology”; and Mooney, “A Deontological 
Problem?” 
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The standard story is that, if both of these theses are true, then God would 
be justified in permitting E. Reitan proposes to modify standard theod-
icies by replacing the axiological thesis with a corresponding thesis that I 
will call a “restriction thesis” (“RT”):
RT: Due to an agent-centered restriction, God is obligated to bring 
about G.20
By replacing the axiological thesis, AT, with the restriction thesis, RT, the 
theodicist is relieved of the burden of challenging (2) and instead chal-
lenges (1).
Reitan illustrates his strategy with a “neo-Kantian” modification of 
Swinburne’s theodicy of moral evil.21 Let “significant freedom” mean the 
ability to freely bring about a variety of states of affairs, ranging from the 
very good to the very bad; and let “the risk of moral evil” mean the state 
of there being a non-trivial chance that serious moral evils will be com-
mitted. Swinburne affirms the following theses:
MT-1: For God, the risk of moral evil is tied to significant freedom.
AT-1: The risk of moral evil is outweighed by significant freedom.
Reitan documents severe criticism of AT-1, and proposes instead that God 
is obligated not to systematically intervene in human affairs to prevent 
humans from perpetrating horrors, even if our freedom is not worth the 
cost of the horrors.22 In effect, he suggests replacing AT-1 with the fol-
lowing restriction thesis:
RT-1a: Due to an agent-centered restriction, God is obligated to give us 
significant freedom.
In defense of this thesis, Reitan argues that a divine policy of systemati-
cally interfering in the world to prevent moral evil would violate human 
dignity, comparing it to a dystopian police state that coercively removes 
everyone’s ability to commit murder. So, according to Reitan, God is obli-
gated to adopt a policy of nonintervention.
Here is a second example of my own. Let “soul-making” mean the 
process of people developing virtuous moral character out of initial moral 
immaturity, due in large part to their own choices. Let a “vale of suffering” 
mean a realm of mixed value, including suffering like that of our own world 
in intensity and frequency. With this terminology in place, we can state the 
pair of theses to which the standard soul-making theodicy is committed:
MT-2: For God, a vale of suffering is tied to soul-making.
AT-2: A vale of suffering is outweighed by soul-making.
20RT restates Reitan’s (2**) in terms of agent-centered restrictions. 
21Swinburne, Providence. 
22Reitan uses “horrors” and “horrendous evils” in the sense of Adams, Horrendous Evils. 
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The traditional soul-making theodicist claims that the truth of these two 
theses is sufficient to justify God’s permission of the evils in the vale of 
suffering. But the restriction strategist might propose exchanging AT-2 for 
this restriction thesis:
RT-2a: Due to an agent-centered restriction, God is obligated to enable 
our soul-making.
There is something to be said for RT-2a. Human flourishing consists at 
least partly in our moral characters being perfected. Perhaps this is one 
reason why parents are obligated to train their children morally: to not 
spoil them, to teach them to get along with their siblings, to teach them 
good manners, etc. Maybe God has even greater responsibilities than 
human parents do to promote human flourishing, with the upshot that 
God is obligated to perfect the characters of fallen or morally immature 
creatures, even if this means placing them in a vale of suffering. Or, in-
stead of an obligation to perfect us, perhaps God is bound by a kind of 
anti-paternalistic obligation to let us develop our characters in the direc-
tion of our own choosing, and a vale of suffering is the only environment 
that will fully enable this choice.23 Either way, I think RT-2a has at least 
some plausibility.24
3.2. The Restriction Strategy and Unconditionally Gratuitous Evil
Reitan’s way of pursuing the restriction strategy targets conditionally gra-
tuitous evils. But what about unconditionally gratuitous evils? Some evils 
strike us as unconditionally gratuitous.25 But what the restriction strategist 
should say about them depends on whether they also seem to be condi-
tionally gratuitous (for God).
For those that do, the restriction strategist could say that the divine 
agent-centered restriction she posits is unique to God, and our intuitions 
that certain evils are unconditionally gratuitous are merely tracking the 
fact that they are unconditionally gratuitous for us. For example, a defender 
of RT-1a could say that, while God has an agent-centered restriction to risk 
certain evils for the sake of human freedom, we are not permitted to bring 
about those evils for that purpose, and we wouldn’t be permitted to even 
if human freedom outweighed them. A defender of RT-2a could say the 
23Cf. Haig, “A Deontological Solution.” 
24Mark Murphy points out that restriction theses like RT-2a are a bit odd in that they 
seem to be forbidding God from maximizing a certain value (the good for human beings) 
for the sake of promoting that very same value in a different way, and ultimately to a lesser 
degree. I think we can reduce this oddness by distinguishing facets of the good for human 
beings. What the restriction is doing is limiting God’s freedom to maximize our physical 
and emotional good, at least for the time being, and instead requiring God to promote our 
spiritual good in certain ways. This sounds less paradoxical to me, though any agent-cen-
tered restriction will inevitably have some scent of paradox about it (Scheffler, The Rejection 
of Consequentialism). 
25As I argue in Mooney, “A Deontological Problem?” 
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same about the evils involved in soul-making. Then the evils in question 
would be unconditionally gratuitous for us but not for God.
In defense of the idea that God has unique agent-centered restrictions 
not shared by any human being, the restriction strategist could remind us 
that many obligations and prerogatives are role-relative, being possessed 
only by those who occupy certain roles like the role of parent, police of-
ficer, or president.26 In light of this observation, it’s not outrageous to think 
that there might be obligations, and indeed agent-centered restrictions, 
that are possessed only by the agent that occupies the role of God of the 
universe.
What about evils which strike us as unconditionally gratuitous, but are 
not conditionally gratuitous—at least not for God? These evils strike us 
as impermissible even though—for God and perhaps for everyone else 
too—they are tied to outweighing goods. For example, one natural way to 
explain the fact that Swinburne’s arguments for AT-1 in the final chapter 
of his book have intuitive force, and yet his critics remain unsatisfied, is 
that, although AT-1 is true, it is morally irrelevant, because at least some 
of the world’s moral evils are impermissible despite being outweighed by 
the good of significant freedom. Similarly, one natural way to explain why 
soul-making theodicists have found AT-2 plausible, and yet their critics 
have been left unsatisfied, is that, while AT-2 is true, it is morally irrele-
vant, because at least some of the world’s evils are impermissible despite 
being outweighed by the good of soul-making.
To deal with this suggestion, the restriction strategist might propose a 
different restriction thesis—one which features a maximizing restriction, 
such as one of the following:
RT-1b: Due to a maximizing restriction, God is obligated to give us sig-
nificant freedom.
RT-2b: Due to a maximizing restriction, God is obligated to enable our 
soul-making.
I suspect that the considerations which lend RT-1a and RT-2a some plau-
sibility also lend RT-1b and RT-2b some plausibility. If one of these theses 
is true, then God will be obligated to permit evil of the sort that occurs in 
our world even if we have an agent-centered restriction against permitting 
it. In that case, the evils in question will be unconditionally gratuitous for 
us, but not for God. Then the restriction strategist could suggest that our 
intuitions that certain extant evils are unconditionally gratuitous are not 
tracking the fact that they are unconditionally gratuitous full stop, but 
rather the fact that they are unconditionally gratuitous for us.
3.3. Evaluating the Restriction Strategy
These sketchy remarks are no more than an outline of some ways that one 
might attempt to carry out the restriction strategy. But an outline affords 
26McConnell, “Moral Dilemmas.” 
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enough material to say something about its prospects. I will consider two 
worries about the strategy: one which I think can be skirted without much 
difficulty, and another that poses a greater challenge.
First, some philosophers will object to the notion that God has moral 
obligations such as agent-centered restrictions, for it might seem inap-
propriate that a perfect being would be bound by external constraints, 
moral or otherwise.27 But, following Reitan, I believe that everything I say 
about divine obligations could be recast in terms of the natural behavior 
of a morally perfect being. One could replace talk of God’s all-things-con-
sidered obligations with talk of what it is necessary that God would do, 
given God’s moral character. And one could replace talk of God’s pro tanto 
obligations with talk of natural inclinations to behave in certain ways. 
Moreover, one could distinguish these natural inclinations from others 
(e.g., love-based inclinations) by positing that they have a distinct phe-
nomenology, or perhaps a slightly different causal role in God’s mental 
life. So, although it is convenient to speak as if God has moral obligations, 
the restriction strategist does not need to take a side on whether this is so.
Now for the most serious worry facing the restriction strategy. In order 
for God to have agent-centered or maximizing restrictions such as those 
discussed above, God’s pro tanto duties must balance out accordingly. 
But, in ordinary moral experience, just as there are cases where our pro 
tanto duties interact so as to generate obligations to permit gratuitous 
suffering, so there are cases where our pro tanto duties interact so as to 
generate an obligation to prevent gratuitous suffering. And surely, like 
us, God will have pro tanto duties of both sorts: duties to intervene and 
duties not to intervene. So, we have to face the question whether God’s 
pro tanto duties will balance out such that a thesis along the lines of RT-1a 
and its counterparts is true—i.e., such that God was obligated to permit 
the world’s suffering.
Prima facie, an affirmative answer to this question is doubtful. As we 
go through life, obligations to permit gratuitous evil seem to be the ex-
ception rather than the rule. True enough, sometimes our hands are tied. 
But not usually—and certainly not in the case of atrocities like those re-
counted by Dostoevsky’s character Ivan Karamozov, as well as the other 
horrors which pepper the literature on the problem of evil. Pro tanto 
duties to prevent gratuitous evil often win out over pro tanto duties to 
permit it, which suggests that the former are very powerful. This should 
at least cast some doubt on ambitious restriction theses like RT-1a and its 
counterparts, which entail that God’s hands are tied (so to speak) with 
respect to all the evil, or even just all the moral evil, in the history of the 
world.28
27E.g., McCann, Creation. 
28Cf. Tooley’s argument featuring the balance of right-making and wrong-making prop-
erties in “The Problem of Evil.” 
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4. The Prerogative Strategy
I turn now to a different strategy for resisting (1). Some theists have ar-
gued that a perfect being need not promote creaturely welfare, thereby 
dissolving a major reason for thinking that (1) is true.29 We can cast this 
idea in an explicitly deontological mold by appealing to agent-centered 
prerogatives and maximizing prerogatives to argue that God has the pre-
rogative to permit gratuitous evil. I will call this the prerogative strategy.
4.1. The Prerogative Strategy and Conditionally Gratuitous Evil
Let’s begin with how the prerogative strategist might handle conditionally 
gratuitous evil. In one sense, the moral requirements that we have with 
respect to conditionally gratuitous evil are not very demanding. Within 
certain limits, it seems permissible for human agents to pursue their own, 
non-value-maximizing projects. And contra authors such as Singer and 
Unger,30 reflection on ordinary moral practice and experience suggests 
that this license extends so far as to permit us to pursue our own projects 
even when our resources could have instead been devoted to alleviating, 
preventing, and campaigning against the world’s multifarious evils. For 
example, it’s plausible that I am not obligated to give all of my available 
money to famine relief or the like. Since sacrificing my personal projects 
seems to be a lesser evil than the suffering I could prevent by doing so, I 
suspect there is an agent-centered prerogative at work here.
The prerogative strategist could claim that, like us, God has an 
agent-centered prerogative to pursue God’s own projects instead of always 
preventing the world’s suffering. After all, even God will have projects 
that can be pursued—e.g., certain worlds that can be created—only at the 
expense of permitting conditionally gratuitous evil.31 So, if morality gives 
us some wiggle room to pursue such projects, maybe it does the same for 
God.32
Ultimately, whether or not God has agent-centered prerogatives sim-
ilar to ours depends on what Scheffler calls “the underlying rationale” 
of agent-centered prerogatives.33 If those prerogatives are morality’s way 
of accommodating human limitations, then presumably God won’t have 
29Davies, The Reality of God; Murphy, God’s Own Ethics; Rea, The Hiddenness of God, ch. 
5. Rea applies the idea to divine hiddenness rather than evil. The connection I draw with 
Singer below is inspired especially by Rea’s comments in the Q & A that follows Lecture 3 of 
his Gifford Lectures. 
30Singer, “Famine”; Unger, Living High. 
31A point which has been made, e.g., by Rea, The Hiddenness of God. 
32On the view that divine “obligations” reduce to divine inclinations, the proposal would 
be that God has natural inclinations that track whatever sort of facts ground moral obliga-
tions for non-divine agents. But how can this be so in the case of agent-centered prerogatives, 
for isn’t God inclined to do the best, when there is a best? One possible response here (which 
I regrettably lack the space to explore) is to say that God really only performs one action: cre-
ating a possible world. Then, if there is no best possible world, there is no best action for God 
to perform, so God is not inclined to do the best. (Thanks to Mark Murphy for this objection.) 
33Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism. 
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them. But we cannot say that morality requires us to maximize the good 
as far as we are able to, given our limitations, for I just rejected that sort 
of view on the grounds that it clashes dramatically with ordinary moral 
practice and moral experience. Instead, the proposal would have to be that 
morality permits us to choose certain goods of lesser value over certain 
goods of greater value, and that human limitations explain why we are 
forced to choose between them in the first place.34
But notice that, on this version of the story, human limitations only 
explain why we are sometimes forced to choose between goods; we still 
lack a story about why, when we are faced with such a choice, we are 
sometimes permitted to choose the lesser good, even when this means per-
mitting gratuitous suffering. For all we have seen so far, that story might 
entail that any agent that is sometimes forced to choose between goods is 
also sometimes permitted to choose lesser goods over greater goods.
For example, a number of authors have defended some version of the 
thought that the reason we are sometimes permitted to choose lesser 
goods over greater goods, when we are confronted with such a choice, 
is rooted in our personhood.35 The rough idea is that a full or natural ex-
pression of personhood requires the moral freedom to pursue personal 
projects with some amount of independence from their overall moral 
value, and morality secures this moral freedom for people by permitting 
them to sometimes choose lesser goods. This view seems to entail that any 
person who is forced to choose between greater and lesser goods may at 
least sometimes choose the lesser goods. And God is one such person, for 
God must choose between the alternative good possible worlds that could 
be created. Indeed, Michael Rea has applied Susan Wolf’s version of this 
idea to God in pursuit of what I take to be a version of the prerogative 
strategy.36
34Might the relevant human limitations be limitations of perspective or point of view, 
rather than of power? (Thanks to Mark Murphy and Wally Wirchnianski for pressing me 
on this issue, and to the latter for helpful discussion.) For example, Scheffler argues that we 
each have a personal point of view from which we weigh our own projects more heavily than 
their impersonal worth, and this is what agent-centered prerogatives accommodate. But if 
Scheffler is right, I’m inclined to say that God probably has a personal point of view in the 
same sense that we do. Why not suppose that God places special value on certain personal 
projects unique to God’s role as creator, such as the project of creating and sustaining what I 
will below call a “world that matters”? In fact, there is independent reason to think that God 
values (in some sense) certain things out of proportion to their impersonal worth. For many 
theists think that there is no best possible world and that therefore God will need to use a 
different decision procedure when creating than one which simply aims to maximize value 
from what Sheffler calls the impersonal point of view. 
35Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism; Williams, in Smart and Williams, Utilitar-
ianism; Wolf, “Moral Saints.” Wolf is not explicit about the application to agent-centered 
prerogatives, but it’s at least a natural thought to have in light of her discussion. If Wolf’s 
idea is taken as a rationale for agent-centered prerogatives, it turns out to be very similar to 
that of Williams. 
36One qualification here. Rea uses Wolf’s work to argue that God can permissibly and 
rationally pursue projects incompatible with promoting human welfare, but it’s not clear 
whether he thinks the resulting human suffering is conditionally gratuitous. (This caveat 
applies to the attribution in n. 31 too.) This makes it unclear whether there is a divine 
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One might object that God’s prerogatives need not extend to permitting 
the evil in our world in order to ensure that God’s projects enjoy sufficient 
independence of moral demands. But something similar holds for human 
beings. I can imagine morality demanding much more charitable giving 
from the affluent to prevent gratuitous evil, while still leaving ample room 
to express their personhood. So, if there is a problem here, it seems to be a 
general problem about agent-centered prerogatives of the sort that we have, 
and not a special problem about extending those prerogatives to God.37
As with the restriction strategy, the prerogative strategy can be pursued 
by restructuring traditional theodicies. For example, Swinburne contends 
that God might choose to create what I will call “a world that matters.”38 
Let “a world that matters” mean a world where creatures have significant 
moral responsibility, because they can freely bring about states of affairs 
ranging from the very good to the very bad; they can dramatically affect 
how well or poorly things go in the world, both for themselves and for 
others; so a great deal is at stake in their choices and lives. For reasons 
that I do not have the space to pursue here, Swinburne contends that a 
world that matters will be one that contains natural evil and at least the 
risk of great moral evil, too.39 The core of his theodicy can be captured in 
the following two theses:
MT-3: For God, natural evil and the risk of moral evil are tied to a 
world that matters.
AT-3: Natural evil and the risk of moral evil are outweighed by a 
world that matters.
The prerogative strategist could adapt Swinburne’s theodicy by pro-
posing that God is justified in permitting the world’s evils, not because 
they are outweighed by the value of a world that matters, but instead be-
cause God has an agent-centered prerogative to create and sustain a world 
that matters. This would mean replacing the above axiological thesis with 
what we can call a prerogative thesis (PT):
PT-1a: Due to an agent-centered prerogative, God is permitted to create 
and sustain a world that matters.
To see that PT-1a is plausible, suppose I want there to be more life in 
the universe, so I introduce primitive life on another planet, knowing that 
it will evolve into creatures like us in conditions much like those here on 
agent-centered prerogative involved. But either way, his proposal could certainly be taken 
in that direction. 
37Thanks to a referee and the editor for comments that improved the discussion in the last 
few paragraphs. 
38Swinburne, Providence. Swinburne uses this locution (or something very close to it) oc-
casionally in his work, but he doesn’t introduce it as a technical term in the way that I have 
done here. 
39For a detailed defense of this thesis, including discussion of how it squares with tradi-
tional views about the afterlife, see Swinburne’s Providence. 
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Earth. I remain on that planet and somehow live long enough to witness 
the evolution of moral agents there. But I don’t devote all of my time, 
energy, and other resources to preventing and alleviating their suffering. 
Instead, I spend some of my time pursuing other projects, like scientific 
study of the biosphere that has evolved, or maintenance of its natural 
beauty.
My intuition about this case is that I have not done anything imper-
missible. It was not impermissible for me to introduce life on the planet, 
and, even though all the conditionally gratuitous suffering on that planet 
is at least indirectly causally downstream of my introducing life there, 
it seems to me that what is morally required of me with respect to the 
suffering of other agents in that planet’s biosphere is not much different 
than what is morally required of me with respect to the suffering of many 
people and nonhuman animals around the world right now. Those moral 
requirements leave plenty of room for pursuing non-value-maximizing 
personal projects.40 But there is an analogy between this case and creating 
and sustaining a world that matters. Among other similarities, in both 
cases an agent initiates processes that will result in a world with the same 
mix of value and disvalue as ours, and pursues projects incompatible with 
preventing gratuitous suffering that occurs causally downstream of initi-
ating those processes. I think the analogy is strong enough to show that 
PT-1a is plausible.41
4.2. The Prerogative Strategy and Unconditionally Gratuitous Evil
So far I have focused on conditionally gratuitous evils. But what about 
unconditionally gratuitous evils? First consider evils which strike us as 
unconditionally gratuitous but are also conditionally gratuitous (for God). 
Since it’s possible for an agent to have an agent-centered prerogative 
40This thought experiment is also a counterexample to Wielenberg’s principle C in his 
“Intrinsic Value and Love.” Another kind of case worth thinking about is that of releasing 
animals into their natural habitats. 
41As a referee points out, one disanalogy that might be important is God’s exhaustive 
foreknowledge or middle knowledge which would enable God to predict each gratuitous 
evil. The referee claims that, if I could predict the gratuitous evils that would result from 
introducing life on the planet, then I would be obligated to prevent those evils (either by in-
tervening or not introducing life on the planet in the first place), and the same goes for God’s 
creation of a world that matters. One way to address this worry is to embrace either open 
theism, on which God lacks exhaustive foreknowledge, or a stage view of foreknowledge, 
where God’s foreknowledge is not able to inform God’s providential decisions (discussed, 
e.g., in Hunt, “Divine Providence,” and Zimmerman, “Simple Foreknowledge”). Another 
response is to deny that the disanalogy has the significance that the referee suggests. I’m 
not sure that I share the referee’s intuition about this. I certainly don’t think that agents 
must always avoid doing anything that they know will result in gratuitous evil that would 
not happen otherwise. On the assumption that many familiar cases of suffering are gra-
tuitous—an assumption which I think many non-theists take for granted—this principle 
suffers counterexamples. Even though I’m confident that any children I might have would 
experience at least some gratuitous suffering in the course of their lives, I think I can have 
children. Even if I have detailed information about the specific suffering that would be pre-
vented if I gave the entirety of my next paycheck to famine relief, I am not obligated to do 
that. And so on. 
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to permit an evil E while another agent does not have a prerogative to 
permit E, the prerogative strategist can say that God has an agent-cen-
tered prerogative to permit those evils even when we find ourselves in 
circumstances where we do not.
What about evils which strike us as unconditionally gratuitous but are 
not also conditionally gratuitous (for God)? I’m inclined to think that the 
reason why Swinburne’s theodicy strikes his critics as morally unsatis-
fying despite the fact that his arguments for AT-3 have considerable force 
is because, although AT-3 is true, it is morally irrelevant. Some evils are 
unconditionally gratuitous despite the fact that they are not conditionally 
gratuitous (for God). In that case, the prerogative strategist can appeal to 
a maximizing prerogative instead of an agent-centered prerogative. She 
could propose the following thesis:
PT-1b: Due to a maximizing prerogative, God is permitted to allow the 
evils that are required to create and sustain a world that matters.
If this thesis is true, then—once again—God will have the prerogative to 
permit suffering of the sort that occurs in our world even if some agents in 
some circumstances do not.
There is something to be said for these suggestions about how the 
prerogative strategist can handle unconditionally gratuitous evil. It’s 
plausible that some of the evils around the world that we could prevent if 
we gave more of our income to charity, or spent more of our time fighting 
for social justice, etc., are unconditionally gratuitous. And since agents 
have the prerogative to pursue their own projects instead of devoting all 
of their available resources to preventing and ending these evils, they 
must be unconditionally gratuitous only relative to agents in certain cir-
cumstances, and not relative to everyone around the world whatsoever. 
And if they are not even unconditionally gratuitous relative to all human 
agents, it’s not outrageous to think that they might not be unconditionally 
gratuitous for a uniquely positioned agent such as God, who alone faces 
the choice between a world that matters and a world that doesn’t.
4.3. Evaluating the Prerogative Strategy
These sketchy remarks are no more than an outline of how one might at-
tempt to carry out the prerogative strategy. But an outline affords enough 
material to say something about its prospects. I will consider two worries 
about the strategy: one that I think can be rebutted, and another that poses 
a much greater challenge.
First, one might object that the prerogative which the prerogative strat-
egist attributes to God is too extreme to be plausible. Surely any credible 
moral theory will entail that an agent who can end massive amounts of 
horrendous evil with minimal effort ought to do so. For example, if you 
could end all the suffering in the world by simply pressing a button, then 
you ought to do it. And you ought to do it even if it would require giving 
up some personal project. But then surely God, who could prevent all 
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suffering from this moment forward without even so much as pressing a 
button, ought to do so, even if it means giving up some divine project.42
I think the best response to this objection is to deny that you ought 
to press the button. For suppose that MT-3 is true. Then, pressing the 
button would mean transforming the world from a world that matters 
into a world that doesn’t matter (in the technical sense introduced above). 
It would mean turning this world into a world where people don’t do 
anything of great moral significance, such as a world where people spend 
most of their time plugged into pleasure machines.43 When I take this fea-
ture of the case seriously, it no longer seems to me that I ought to press 
the button. Granted, God could dramatically reduce, without completely 
eliminating, the evil in the world.44 But if Swinburne is right, the world 
can matter to greater or lesser degrees, and any significant reduction in the 
world’s horrendous evil would require a similarly significant reduction in 
the extent to which the world is one that matters.45 Were I in a position to 
do this to our world at the press of a button, it is not obvious to me that I 
ought to do so.46
I see two ways to explain my intuitions about pressing these buttons, 
provided that they are correct. First, we could say that (i) a world that 
matters to the degree that ours does, but also has suffering comparable to 
ours, is less valuable than a world that matters much less, but has much 
less suffering; (ii) nevertheless, an agent in a position to choose between 
them has the agent-centered prerogative to choose worlds that matter 
more. Second—and this is my preference—we could say that (i) a world 
that matters as much as ours does, but also has suffering comparable to 
ours, is more valuable than a world that matters much less, but has much 
less suffering; and (ii) any unconditionally gratuitous evils in the former 
worlds are not unconditionally gratuitous relative to an agent who is 
choosing between those worlds. The agent has a maximizing prerogative 
to choose a world like ours. Either of these explanations suits the prerog-
ative strategist.
Here now is the objection that I think poses the most serious problem 
for the prerogative strategy. Moral requirements to prevent gratuitous suf-
fering are not the only reason many have thought that premise (1) is true. 
It is a truism in western monotheistic traditions that God loves us. But if 
God loves us, God would want to protect us from gratuitous suffering 
42Versions of this objection were put to me by Dan Dake and a referee. 
43This case is inspired by cases from McCann’s Creation and the final chapter of Swin-
burne’s Providence. 
44Thanks to a referee for this point. 
45See, e.g., Swinburne’s discussion of a “toy-world” in The Existence of God, 263-7.
46If we further limit the effects of pressing the button, this intuition gets weaker and 
weaker. But at the same time, our imagined situation becomes less and less like God’s—which 
may suggest that we are entering territory where God has prerogatives that we don’t—and 
moreover the prerogative that God would need in order to permissibly refrain from doing 
the equivalent of pressing the button becomes less and less extreme. 
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even if God was not obligated to. Love is a powerful motivator. Therefore, 
even granting the prerogative strategist everything she wants, there is still 
a powerful argument for (1).
The best place to resist this argument is to challenge the premise that, 
if God loves us, then God will protect us from gratuitous suffering even 
if God is not obligated to. There are different ways to do this. One could 
argue that God’s love for us does not move God to protect us from gra-
tuitous suffering because God is not able to protect us from gratuitous 
suffering. But given divine omnipotence, this suggestion has not been 
popular. One could instead argue that God’s love for us does not move 
God to protect us from gratuitous suffering because God is not permitted 
to protect us from gratuitous suffering. I think this suggestion is more 
promising, and I will return to it in the next section. But for now I note 
simply that it is no part of the prerogative strategy to argue that God is 
not permitted to prevent gratuitous suffering; that is the burden of the 
restriction strategy.
The typical response from prerogative strategists is that God’s love 
does not move God to protect us from gratuitous suffering because of the 
ways divine love differs from human love, either in its nature or in how 
it is manifested. But although defenses of this thesis by prerogative strat-
egists are impressive, they are bound to leave some unsatisfied.47 After 
all, it seems seriously conceptually strained to suggest that a being who 
permits people to suffer gratuitously and horrendously over long periods 
of time loves those people in any sense even distantly analogous to our 
notion of love. Rea ultimately falls back on skeptical theism to handle this 
strain, but I won’t follow him there, as I am aiming for a theodicy.48 So, the 
prerogative strategy could benefit from a better response to this objection.
5. The Restriction-Prerogative Strategy
We’ve now seen two strategies for resisting premise (1): the restriction 
strategy and the prerogative strategy. In this section I propose a third 
strategy for resisting (1) which combines the restriction and preroga-
tive strategies, and I argue that combining these strategies dissolves the 
primary problem that each faces when taken on its own. I will call this 
combined strategy the restriction-prerogative strategy.
The restriction and prerogative strategies are compatible: it could be 
the case both that God is not obligated to prevent the gratuitous suffering 
in the world, as the prerogative strategy claims, and that God is obligated 
not to prevent that suffering, as the restriction strategy claims. So, to take 
a concrete example, suppose that a world that matters does not outweigh 
its suffering, and so the suffering it contains is conditionally gratuitous for 
God. To account for this evil, the Restriction-prerogative strategist might 
endorse this prerogative thesis PT-1a from the previous section, and one 
47Wielenberg, “Intrinsic Value.” 
48Rea, The Hiddenness of God, 88–89. 
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or both of the restriction theses RT-1a and RT-2a. Roughly, the idea is that 
God has the (agent-centered) prerogative to create a world that matters, 
but there are still restrictions on how God can run that world.
Alternatively, the restriction-prerogative strategist might think, as I do, 
that the value of a world that matters does outweigh the evil it contains, 
so if there is anything right about dissatisfaction with theodicies like 
Swinburne’s, it stems from the fact that some of the evil in a world that 
matters strikes us as unconditionally gratuitous. In that case, she might 
adopt a prerogative thesis such as PT-1b, and combine this with a restric-
tion thesis such as one (or both) of the maximizing restriction theses RT-1b 
and RT-2b. Once again, the rough idea is that God has a prerogative to 
create a world with gratuitous evil, but there are restrictions on how God 
can run it. As I will now argue, this simple move of combining the two 
strategies dissolves the most pressing problem for each.
Recall that the problem for the restriction strategy was that, even if God 
is sometimes obligated to permit gratuitous suffering, it’s likely that the 
pro tanto duties of non-intervention which undergird those obligations 
are often overridden by pro tanto duties to intervene, such that God is ob-
ligated to prevent more of the world’s suffering than has been prevented. 
And the problem with the prerogative strategy was that, even if God is 
not required to prevent our suffering, God would do so anyway because 
God loves us. But I will now argue that, if God has the prerogative to 
permit the world’s suffering, then it is plausible that God’s pro tanto du-
ties of nonintervention stand undefeated after all. Hence the problem for 
the restriction strategy is solved. And if those pro tanto obligations stand 
undefeated, then, however much God loves us, God cannot prevent our 
suffering because God is not permitted to.49 Hence the problem for the 
prerogative strategy is also solved.
The key to both solutions is the thesis that, given a divine prerogative 
to permit the world’s suffering, God’s pro tanto obligations to permit that 
suffering stand undefeated. I will defend this claim by returning to an ear-
lier observation: reflection on commonsense morality and ordinary moral 
practice suggests that human beings are not required to devote all of their 
extraneous resources to preventing and alleviating the multifarious evils 
around the world. We have the prerogative to devote a great deal of our 
resources to pursuing leisure activities, the arts, business endeavors, and 
so on, even when we could instead be actively pursuing social justice, 
volunteering at soup kitchens, and donating more to famine relief, cancer 
research, crime prevention, etc. Let’s explore this point for a moment.
Many of the evils which we could prevent or alleviate with our ex-
traneous resources are probably either conditionally gratuitous for us or 
unconditionally gratuitous for at least some agents in some circumstances. 
49I take it this has always been the restriction strategist’s explanation for why God’s love 
does not move God to protect us from suffering. E.g., see Reitan’s closing flourish, “God can 
only weep and wait” in his “A Deontological Theodicy.” 
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So, the fact that we are not required to use all of our extraneous resources 
in this way must be due to agent-centered and/or maximizing preroga-
tives to permit gratuitous suffering. Suppose that I have a pro tanto duty 
to prevent certain gratuitous suffering, as well as the prerogative not to 
prevent it. Then I must also have a pro tanto duty that I can fulfill (or fulfill 
to a greater degree) only if I do not prevent that suffering. For suppose I 
didn’t. Then my choice is between (i) fulfilling the pro tanto obligation to 
prevent the suffering plus whatever other pro tanto duties I may have, or 
(ii) fulfilling only the latter. In that case, I can minimize my pro tanto duty 
violations only by preventing the suffering. So, on Rossian Minimalism, I 
am obligated to prevent the suffering. And if I am obligated to prevent the 
suffering, then I do not have the prerogative to permit it.
Therefore, any agent who has a prerogative not to prevent certain 
gratuitous suffering cannot also have a pro tanto duty to prevent that 
suffering unless she has some contrary pro tanto duty as well to balance 
it out. But in many cases where we have a prerogative not to prevent suf-
fering (like when we have a prerogative not to give to famine relief), it 
is doubtful that we have such contrary pro tanto obligations. For when 
we are not obligated to prevent gratuitous suffering that we are able to 
prevent, we are often permitted to engage in morally unimportant projects 
and leisure activities instead. In many such cases, it is plausible that the 
only reasons I have not to prevent suffering are whatever reasons I have 
to pursue those projects or leisure activities. And surely those reasons do 
not have the moral weight of pro tanto obligations—much less pro tanto 
obligations that would intuitively balance out a pro tanto obligation to 
prevent gratuitous suffering.
This suggests that the reason we have a prerogative not to devote all of 
our available resources to preventing the world’s evils is not that, although 
we have a pro tanto duty to do so, that duty is counterbalanced by other 
pro tanto duties. Rather, the reason is that we have no pro tanto duty to 
use our resources that way in the first place.
We can test this proposal by considering cases where it is plausible 
that agents are not required to prevent gratuitous suffering that they are 
able to prevent: e.g., supererogatory levels of charitable giving, volunteer 
work, pursuit of social justice, etc. If I’m right that agents often do not have 
even a pro tanto obligation to do these things, then it should be easy to 
generate an all-things-considered obligation not to prevent the suffering in 
these cases by simply adding a relatively unimportant contrary pro tanto 
obligation to the case, for then I could minimize my pro tanto duty viola-
tions only by not preventing the suffering.
And it turns out, we are able to do precisely that. For example, however 
much I may want to give my latest paycheck to famine relief, I think I am 
obligated not to if I have solemnly promised it to a friend to help her start 
a business. Or however much I want to work in a soup kitchen today, 
perhaps motivated by a love of humanity, I ought not to if it would make 
me two hours late to work (and I have not gotten permission to be late, 
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etc.). And so on. This seems to confirm that, although we have reasons to 
prevent gratuitous suffering that we are not obligated to prevent, never-
theless, we do not have even a pro tanto obligation to prevent it.
The prerogative strategist should say the same about God. God has 
the prerogative to allow the suffering that has occurred in the history of 
the world, not because God has pro tanto obligations to prevent that suf-
fering that are counterbalanced by other pro tanto obligations, but rather 
because God has no pro tanto obligations to prevent that suffering in the 
first place.
And now it is clear that the pro tanto duties posited by the restriction 
strategist will stand undefeated. For if indeed God has no pro tanto duties 
to prevent the suffering in the history of the world, and God has pro tanto 
duties to permit that suffering, then God can minimize God’s pro tanto 
duty violations only by permitting the world’s suffering. By permitting 
that suffering, God can satisfy both the restriction strategy’s pro tanto du-
ties, and any other pro tanto duties God has. Whereas, by preventing the 
world’s suffering, God satisfies at most only the latter.
Since God’s pro tanto duties to permit suffering carry the day, the 
problem for the restriction strategy is solved. And since this means that 
God is obligated to permit the world’s suffering, the prerogative strategist’s 
problem is solved, too. For however much God’s love may motivate God 
to prevent the suffering that befalls us, God cannot do so, because God is 
obligated not to. So, it looks as though we can solve the problems facing 
the restriction and prerogative strategies by simply combining them.
I offer the Restriction-Prerogative strategy for resisting the argument 
that opened the article: leave (2) alone, and target (1) instead. But don’t do 
this by pursuing either the restriction strategy by itself, or the prerogative 
strategy by itself. Instead, combine them. For while each strategy by itself 
is unpromising, by employing them together, the theist may be able to 
solve the problem of evil.50
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